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ABSTRACT
Due to the rapid advances in the development of quantum comput-
ers and their susceptibility to errors, there is a renewed interest
in error correction algorithms. In particular, error correcting code-
based cryptosystems have reemerged as a highly desirable coding
technique. This is due to the fact that most classical asymmetric
cryptosystems will fail in the quantum computing era. Quantum
computers can solve many of the integer factorization and discrete
logarithm problems efficiently. However, code-based cryptosystems
are still secure against quantum computers, since the decoding of
linear codes remains as NP-hard even on these computing systems.
One such cryptosystem is the McEliece code-based cryptosystem.
The original McEliece code-based cryptosystem uses binary Goppa
code, which is known for its good code rate and error correction
capability. However, its key generation and decoding procedures
have a high computation complexity. In this work we propose a
design and hardware implementation of an public-key encryption
and decryption co-processor based on a new variant of McEliece
system. This co-processor takes the advantage of the non-binary Or-
thogonal Latin Square Codes to achieve much smaller computation
complexity, hardware cost, and the key size.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the possibility of using quantum effects in computation was
brought up by Feynman in 1959, numerous efforts have been dedi-
cated to realize and even commercialize the quantum computers.
In the past three years, a number of significant milestones have
been reached in this area. From late 2017 to early 2018, technol-
ogy companies such as IBM, Intel, and Google, announced their
construction and testing of 50-, 49-, and 72-qubit computers, respec-
tively. In July 2018, for the first time, researchers at the University
of Sydney successfully realized a multi-qubit computation on a sys-
tem of trapped ions, which is believed to be the leading platform in
building general quantum computers [3]. In December 2018, IonQ
claimed to have built a quantum computer with 160 qubits. Besides
these advances in physical implementation of quantum comput-
ers, key breakthroughs in the verification of quantum computation
were also achieved [1], and more efficient error correction schemes
were recently proposed as well. These efforts are rooted in the fact
that quantum computers promise greater computational power.
But these developments also bring with them burning security
concerns. For example, Shor’s algorithm [6], leveraging quantum
Fourier transform, is able to solve the integer factorization problem
efficiently. Therefore, current popular cryptographic algorithms
such as RSA, ElGamal, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC, which rely on
the hardness of integer factorization and discrete logarithm, are
vulnerable to quantum computer-based algorithms.
In response to the aforementioned security challenges associated
with quantum computers, a number of new cryptosystems has been
proposed for the post-quantum era. In early 2017, NIST launched a
campaign for a post-quantum cryptography standardization. Up to
February 2019, totally 27 out of 69 candidates of this new standard
made to the second round of competition [5]. Among the 27, the
two most likely contenders are the lattice-based cryptosystems (12
candidates), and the code-based cryptosystems (8 candidates). Both
of them are able to construct public-key cryptosystems and key
exchange mechanisms.
Compared to the popular lattice-based ring-learning with er-
ror (Ring-LWE) cryptosystem, error-correcting code (ECC)-based
schemes have a much larger key size, which is considered a draw-
back. However, they do bear the advantage of withstanding the
test of time. For example, since its formulation by Robert McEliece
in 1978 [4], the McEliece code-based technique has so far proven
to be cryptanalysis resistant (although sometimes increasing the
key size is necessary). The conventional McEliece cryptosystem
uses the binary Goppa code, which has good code rate and error
correction capability. However, comparing with other binary codes,
the generating and decoding (error-correction) of binary Goppa
codes have relatively high complexity since they involve intensive
computations over finite fields, including modulo polynomial op-
erations. In addition, the key size of McEliece systems is usually
large. For a binary Goppa code with an k × n generating matrix,
the key size is kn with k,n in thousands of bits.
Therefore, to address these issues, we propose a new variant of
McEliece cryptosystem and its encryption-decryption co-processor.
The proposed system is based on the generalized non-binary Or-
thogonal Latin Square Code (OLSC), which is known for its simple
encoding and decoding algorithms, leading to potential efficient
hardware implementation. In addition, the non-binary OLSC is able
to work with non-binary messages through binary matrices. In
other words, a long message is able to be processed by relatively
small matrices, which reduces the key size.
2 THE OLSC-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM
2.1 The McEliece Algorithm
The detailed protocol of the public-key cryptosystem (PKC) can
be found in [4]. Here we provide a brief introduction to aid the
presentation of the co-processor.
Key generation: Alice picks a binary (n,k, t) ECC code C with
k information (plaintext) bits, n total codeword length, and the
capability of correcting up to t random errors. The k ×n generating
matrix of C is denoted by G. Alice also picks a k × k binary non-
singular matrix S and a n × n permutation matrix P . Then Alice
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Figure 1: McEliece Cryptosystem Co-Processor Architecture.
computes the public key G ′ as:
G ′ = SGP . (1)
Alice keeps S,G, P as the private key.
Encryption: Bob converts his message (plaintext) into a k-bit
binary vectorm, and generates the n-bit cipher {c} as:
c =mG ′ + e, (2)
where e is a binary vector weight t .
Decryption: Alice decrypts the cipher by performing:
m = (Decode(cP−1))S−1 (3)
where Decode() stands for the error correction function of C , and
P−1, S−1 are the inverse matrices of P , S respectively.
2.2 Cryptosystem Co-Processor Architecture
TheMcEliece based public key encryption cryptosystem co-processor
has three modules: the Key Generation, encryption and decryption,
shown in Fig 1. Of the three modules, the decryption unit has the
highest complexity and consumes the most hardware resources,
especially, its Decode stage. Therefore, our efficient implementation
primarily targets the Decode sub-module.
The Orthogonal Latin Square Code (OLSC): The OLSC tech-
nique is a t-error-correcting binary code with its decoding matrix
H = [M |I ], where M consists of 2t − 2 orthogonal Latin squares
sized q × q, and I is an identity matrix of order 2tq. Its generating
matrix is G = [I |M⊤], where ⊤ stands for transpose. Once con-
structed, the columns of generating matrices can be permuted to
create different OLSCs with the same parameters.
Algorithm 1 is the decoding procedure of OLSC codes, which
consists mostly of binary linear operations. Thus, it can be car-
ried out fast and efficient in hardware. In [2], authors generated
the binary OLSC to non-binary codes while still maintaining low
decoding complexity. By replacing the binary Goppa code with
the non-binary OLSC, the decoding stage only requires (1) binary
vector-matrix multiplication and (2) k parallel majority votings
among q non-binary vectors each. This feature enables much faster
decryption time than the Goppa-code based scheme, as shown in
Table 1.
Due to this simpler decoding mechanism, in the OLSC-based
McEliece cryptosystem co-processor, we are able to design a single-
cycle (one-step) decoding unit. This design is much faster than
an equivalent binary Goppa code-based system. The non-binary
OLSC is able to encode a kb-bit plaintext with a k × n generating
matrixG (b being the size of each non-binary symbol), while binary
Goppa code can only deal with k-bit plaintexts with such a matrix.
In other words, given the same size of plaintext, the key size of the
non-binary OLSC-based McEliece cryptosystem is 1/b that of the
Goppa code-based. Given a proper verification on the security level
of the OLSC-based scheme with various decoding techniques, it
could serve as an efficient and high speed variant of the McEliece
cryptosystem.
Algorithm 1: OLSC-based McEliece Cryptosystem
1 Let G ′ = SGP and t be the public key, and {G, S, P}
the private key, where G is a k × n OLSC
encoding matrix with random permutation of
columns, and H as its corresponding decoding
matrix. Let each Latin square be of size q × q,
m be the plaintext, and c the encrypted cipher.
2
3 Precompute: S−1, P−1 as the inverse to S, P.
4
5 c ′ ← cP−1
6 u ← Hc ′ × H
7 for i=0 to n
8 m′i ← (ui > q/2)? ∼ c ′i : c ′i
9 m ←m′S−1
10 return m
Table 1: Complexity Analysis
Finite Field Ops Latency (cycles)
Binary Goppa Code-based O (n2) O (n)
OLSC-based 0 O (1)
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